

# U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION (CLOSED)

15AUG13

LARCENY - PERSONAL (II)

CONTROL: 01AUG13-MEDJ-0089-6TNA/C

I/REQUEST FOR LIMITED ASSISTANCE FROM NAVAL SECURITY FORCES, CRIMINAL  
INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION, CAMP LEMONNIER, DJIBOUTI

COMMAND/CAMP LEMONNIER, DJIBOUTI/3379A

MADE AT/MEDJ/DJIBOUTI - NCISRU (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SPECIAL AGENT

## REFERENCE(S)

(A) NAVAL SECURITY FORCES, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION, CAMP  
LEMONNIER, DJIBOUTI, CASE # 133955A00130

## EXHIBIT(S)

(1) IA: RESULTS OF DIGITAL PHOTOGRAPHIC LINEUP SUPPORT/13AUG13

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. As background, on 13Jul13 a female United States Air Force (USAF) victim reported to Naval Security Forces, CLDJ, that she discovered an unknown Black male, wearing a United States Navy (USN) uniform and cover with the rank of a petty officer second class and between 5' 10" to 6' 00" tall, sorting through her clothes inside a dryer in the C-Block laundry room of the containerized living units (CLU). The victim confronted the unknown Black male, who stated that he was taking out her clothes to use the dryer. The female victim found that explanation odd when she noticed that four other dryers were available for his use. The victim left the laundry room with her clothes and noticed a pair of underwear was missing while she sorted her clothes inside her CLU. She returned to the laundry room and did not find her missing garment or the unknown Black male. On 18Jul13, the victim encountered the unknown Black male at the galley and noticed the last name of Walker on his USN uniform. On 01Aug13 MA2 (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USN, Naval Security Forces, CID, CLDJ, requested NCIS investigative assistance in obtaining a common access card (CAC) photograph and a subsequent photographic lineup containing the CAC photograph of AO2 (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USN. According to (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) is the only USN sailor with the rank of petty officer second class aboard CLDJ.

## NARRATIVE

1. This limited assistance investigation was initiated pursuant to a request for assistance from Naval Security Forces, Criminal Investigation Division (CID), Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti (CLDJ) in an ongoing Larceny investigation and pertains to suspected violation of Article 121 (Larceny and Wrongful Appropriation) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Reference (A) pertains.

2. On 01Aug13 MA2 (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USN, Naval Security Forces, CID, CLDJ, requested NCIS investigative assistance in obtaining a common access card (CAC) photograph and a subsequent photographic lineup containing the CAC

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photograph of AO2 (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USN, Patrol Squadron Four Seven (VP-47), who is currently assigned to Patrol Squadron Four (VP-4), Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) aboard CLDJ.

3. On 06Aug13, Participating Agent (PA) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) produced and provided a six-image sequential digital photographic lineup, with (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) in position #4, via electronic mail to Reporting Agent (RA). Exhibit (1) pertains. RA subsequently forwarded the electronic email containing the photographic lineup to (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) on 06Aug13.

4. Request for NCIS assistance from Naval Security Forces, CID, CLDJ is complete. This investigation is closed.

DISTRIBUTION

NCISHQ:023B

INFO :MEFO

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PAGE 2 LAST (b)(6), (b)(7)(2) LNN

# U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION (INFO)

14MAY13

SPECIAL INQUIRY (II)

CONTROL: 01MAY13-MEDJ-0048-6XCR

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

COMMAND/CAMP LEMONNIER, DJIBOUTI/3379A

MADE AT/MEDJ/DJIBOUTI - NCISRU (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SPECIAL AGENT

EXHIBIT(S)

(1) IA: Receipt of Documentation/03MAY13

## NARRATIVE

1. On 01MAY13, at approximately 0615 NCISRA Djibouti received information from Camp Security, Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti (CLDJ) of the detention of a foreign national (FN) who had gained unauthorized access to CLDJ. Camp Security briefed Reporting Agent (RA) that at about 0430, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) CIV challenged a male FN in the female latrine within a secure compound aboard CLDJ. The subject was reportedly wearing a pair of shorts and a towel and when confronted, fled the scene, grabbing (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) personal cellphone placed exterior the latrine. The subject was subsequently found hiding between two conex boxes, whereupon attempts were made to identify and question him. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) cellphone was recovered and the subject's clothing was retrieved. The Compound Security Manager and CLDJ Camp Security arrived on the scene and additional attempts to identify the subject were unproductive. RA was in receipt of Camp Security documentation, to include witness statements, Exhibit (1) pertains.

2. RA conducted an interview of the subject, with language translation provided by NCIS Category III Linguist (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) CIV. The subject identified himself as (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), born in (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Somalia in 1992. He said he came to Djibouti in 2004 and his family lives in the city of Wachale, Somalia. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) related he was unemployed and described himself as a pickpocket and petty thief.

3. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) admitted to climbing a fence to gain access to CLDJ via Djibouti-Ambouli International Airport to the immediate north, for the expressed purpose of stealing property and food. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) further admitted in NOV11 he was caught stealing aboard the adjacent French Air Base; later confirmed by French base personnel. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) related he gained knowledge and devised a plan to access CLDJ upon ascertaining its perimeter from the French Air Base. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he was on CLDJ property for approximately two hours before he was apprehended.

4. Processing of (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was conducted via a Secure Electronic Enrollment Kit (SEEK II) biometrics device, which returned negative against

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14MAY13

the CJTF-HOA SEEK II database. RA facilitated the transfer of custody of (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) to Djibouti Gendarmerie, whereupon (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was charged with unlawful entry and theft.

5. On 10MAY13, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was nominated to the Department of Defense (DOD) Biometrically Enabled Watch List (BEWL) in Tier 3-4, with Third Country National (TCN) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). His status in the system denies any future ability to have authorized access to DOD installations and/or be hired by US interests.

6. Subsequent to entering a guilty plea, on 14MAY13, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) confirmed his guilty plea and was sentenced to two (2) years confinement, followed by deportation, by the Judicial Court, Djibouti City, Djibouti. CAPT (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USN, Commanding Officer, CLDJ and LT (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Staff Judge Advocate (SJA), CLDJ have been apprised of this incident.

PARTICIPANTS

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) NCIS CAT III LINGUIST, NCISRA Djibouti

DISTRIBUTION

NCISHQ:023B (E)

INFO :COMMAND (CO/XO Only) (H)/MEFO (E)

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# U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION (CLOSED ONLY)

12JUL13

LARCENY - GOVERNMENT (II)

CONTROL: 02JUL13-MEDJ-0073-6SNA/C

I/USAF 726TH EABS, CAMP LEMONNIER, DJIBOUTI/STOLEN GYMNASIUM AND  
EXERCISE EQUIPMENT

COMMAND/COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE HORN OF AFRICA/20700

MADE AT/MEDJ/DJIBOUTI - NCISRU (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SPECIAL AGENT

## EXHIBIT(S)

- (1) IA: RESULTS OF CONTACT WITH (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USA, NAVAL SECURITY FORCES, CAMP LEMONNIER, DJIBOUTI/02JUL13
- (2) IA: RESULTS OF INTERVIEW WITH SMSgt (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USAF, 449TH AIR EXPEDITIONARY GROUP, CAMP LEMONNIER, DJIBOUTI/02JUL13
- (3) IA: RESULTS OF REVIEW OF SURVEILLANCE VIDEO FOR CAMERA 29, BLOCK F OF THE CONTAINERIZED LIVING UNITS, CAMP LEMONNIER, DJIBOUTI/04JUL13
- (4) IA: RESULTS OF CONTACT WITH MAJ (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USAF, 726TH EXPEDITIONARY AIR BASE SQUADRON, CAMP LEMONNIER, DJIBOUTI/05JUL13
- (5) IA: RESULTS OF CONTACT WITH TSgt (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USAF, 726TH EXPEDITIONARY AIR BASE SQUADRON, CAMP LEMONNIER, DJIBOUTI/05JUL13
- (6) IA: RESULTS OF CONTACT WITH UNITED STATES ARMY PERSONNEL ABOARD CAMP LEMONNIER, DJIBOUTI/06JUL13
- (7) IA: RESULTS OF SCREENING INTERVIEWS WITH US ARMY PERSONNEL MANNING ENDURING GATE POST, CAMP LEMONNIER, DJIBOUTI/07JUL13
- (8) IA: RESULTS OF CONTACT WITH MAJ (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USAF AND SMSGT (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USAF, 726TH EXPEDITIONARY AIR BASE SQUADRON, CAMP LEMONNIER, DJIBOUTI/08JUL13
- (9) IA: RESULTS OF SCREENING INTERVIEWS WITH 726 EABS PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO NAVAL SECURITY FORCES, CAMP LEMONNIER/12JUL13
- (10) SWORN STATEMENT OF SPC (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) /09JUL13
- (11) SWORN STATEMENT OF PFC (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USA/09JUL13

## NARRATIVE

1. This reactive investigation pertains to suspected violations of Article 121 (Larceny and Wrongful Appropriation) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).

2. As background, on 02Jul13 at about 1600 hrs, NCISRA Djibouti was advised by MSgt (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USAF, Naval Security Forces, Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti (CLDJ) that three pallets containing gymnasium and exercise equipment were reported as missing and/or stolen from the United States Air Force (USAF), 449th Air Expeditionary Group (AEG), Detachment 1 (DET 1), CLDJ. The missing equipment was palletized and ready for air transportation to USAF personnel assigned to Niamey, Niger. The value of the gymnasium and exercise equipment was estimated at \$18,450.00 (USD). The three pallets

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containing such equipment were last seen on 01Jul13 at about 1900 outside Tent K198, CLDJ, when 449th AEG, DET 1 personnel ended their shift. On 04Jul13 the pallets were discovered inside an area commonly known as the Remote Piloted Aircraft (RPA) compound aboard CLDJ. The RPA compound is used by USAF personnel assigned to the 60th Expeditionary Reconnaissance Squadron (60 ERS), which falls under the 380th Expeditionary Operations Group (380 EOG).

3. On 02Jul13, SGT (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USA, Naval Security Forces, CLDJ, provided Reporting Agent (RA) with a Voluntary Statement made by SMSgt (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USAF, 449TH AEG, in relation to this investigation. Exhibit (1) pertains.

4. On 02Jul13, RA interviewed (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and obtained additional information to include missing equipment documentation and potential investigative leads. Exhibit (2) pertains.

5. On 03Jul13 and 04Jul13, RA met with (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) CIV, British Aerospace Engineering (BAE), CLDJ to review surveillance footage from Camera 29, which is located on Block F of the containerized living units (CLUs) aboard CLDJ. Camera 29 did not record any information of value and no other security camera near Tent K198 or near the RPA compound were identified. Exhibit (3) pertains.

6. On 05Jul13, NCISRA Djibouti learned that the three pallets containing gym and exercise equipment were found at the RPA compound. MAJ (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USAF, Commander, 726th Expeditionary Air Base Squadron (EABS) advised that the pallets were found on 04Jul13 by LTC (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USAF, Deputy Commander, 449th AEG while conducting a "walk through" of the RPA compound. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and RA met at Tent K198 and subsequently drove to the RPA compound. Exhibit (4) pertains.

7. On 05Jul13, RA met with TSgt (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USAF, 726th EABS to photographically document the three pallets containing gym equipment. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) accompanied RA to the RPA compound to photograph the area where the pallets were found by (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and to photograph a Caterpillar 928H forklift that could have possibly been used to move the pallets from Tent K198 to the RPA compound. Exhibit (5) pertains.

8. On 06Jul13, RA met with United States Army personnel to identify soldiers assigned to the Enduring Gate post, CLDJ for 01Jul13 and 02Jul13. 2LT (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USA provided personnel roster and a log kept by Army soldiers at the post. Exhibit (6) pertains.

9. On 07Jul13, RA conducted screening interviews of Army soldiers manning the Enduring Gate post on the evening of 01Jul13 and on the morning of 02Jul13. SPC (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USA, and PFC (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USA, advised they remember encountering a forklift carrying pallets containing gym and exercise equipment through the Enduring Gate on 02Jul13 between 0300 hrs and 0500 hrs. Both soldiers recall the forklift entering through the Enduring Gate, making a "u-turn" and traveling west on a dirt road that runs parallel to the southern taxiway. Neither (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) nor (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) observed the forklift's final destination as it traveled

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west along the dirt road and neither knew if the forklift entered the RPA compound. Exhibit (7) pertains.

10. On 08Jul13, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USAF, 726th EABS met with Supervisory Special Agent (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and RA to discuss this captioned investigation. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) provided information regarding vehicles used by personnel from the 60 ERS. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised the RPA compound is guarded by personnel at two gated entrances to the compound. Exhibit (8) pertains.

11. On 08Jul13, RA conducted screening interviews 726th EABS personnel assigned to Naval Security Forces, CLDJ to determine if they observed a forklift carrying the three pallets containing the gym and exercise equipment into the RPA compound during the hours of 0300 hrs through 0500 hrs on 02Jul13. No information of value was obtained. Exhibit (9) pertains.

12. On 09Jul13, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) provided sworn statements detailing their recollection of their 02Jul13 duty at Enduring Gate. Exhibits (10) and (11) pertain.

13. On 10Jul13, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) briefed COL (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), USAF, Commander, 449th AEG, LTC (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USA, Deputy Staff Judge Advocate, Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) and CPT (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USAF, Assistant Staff Judge Advocate, CJTF-HOA, on the facts of this investigation. Concurrently, LT (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USN, Staff Judge Advocate, CLDJ has been apprised of the facts pertaining to this investigation.

14. On 11Jul13, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) briefed MAJ (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USAF, Director, Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI), Region 5 OL-A, Ramstein AB, Germany (USAFE - Europe & Africa), regarding this investigation. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised a USAF Command Directed Investigation would be the best course of action to determine why the gym equipment was removed from 449th AEG and why it was recovered on the RPA compound.

15. To date, investigative efforts have not identified a potential suspect(s) or other witnesses in regards to this captioned investigation. A copy of this investigation will be provided to (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) for action deemed appropriate. This investigation is closed.

## PARTICIPANTS

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SUPERVISORY SPECIAL AGENT, DJIBOUTI - NCISRU

## DISTRIBUTION

NCISHQ:0023

INFO : (COL (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USAF, Commander, 449th AEG) (H) /  
(LTC (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), USA, Deputy Staff Judge Advocate,  
CJTF-HOA) (H) / (CPT (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USAF, Assistant Staff  
Judge Advocate, CJTF-HOA) (H) / (MAJ (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USAF,  
Director, AFOSI, Region 5 OL-A, Ramstein AB, Germany (USAFE -  
Europe & Africa)) (M) / MEFO

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# U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION (CLOSED ONLY)

06JAN15

BRIBERY (II)

CONTROL: 05JAN15-MEDJ-0002-4HNA/C

I/CAMP LEMONNIER, DJIBOUTI/RECEIPT OF WEBTIP REGARDING ALLEGED BRIBERY  
BY KBR EMPLOYEE

COMMAND/CAMP LEMONNIER, DJIBOUTI/3379A

MADE AT/MEDJ/DJIBOUTI - NCISRU (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SPECIAL AGENT

EXHIBIT(S)

(1) NCIS WEBTIP #W840-3967/11DEC14

(2) IA: Results of Review of KBR Investigative Report/06JAN15

## NARRATIVE

1. This reactive investigation was initiated pursuant to receipt of NCIS Webtip Report Number NCIS-20144532, Alternate Identification Number W840-3967. No criminal statutes apply.

2. Circa December 2014, NCISRA Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti (CLDJ), received a Webtip alleging fraudulent recruitment and bribery by Kellogg, Brown, and Root (KBR) employee, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) CIV, Human Resources Specialist, CLDJ. Specifically, the Webtip alleged that (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) a Kenyan national, was soliciting monetary bribes from other Kenyan nationals to hire their relatives for KBR positions aboard CLDJ, Exhibit (1) pertains.

3. On 20DEC14, contact was established with (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) CIV, Senior Security Manager, KBR, CLDJ, and (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) CIV, Senior Security Technician, KBR, CLDJ, regarding the subject investigation. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) indicated KBR headquarters had recently received an identical complaint, which was forwarded to (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) for investigation.

4. On 05JAN15, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) provided investigative documentation regarding the aforementioned KBR investigation. Review of the KBR investigative report determined the allegations were unfounded, as no evidence of criminal activity was obtained. The investigation revealed that while (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) does have a role in screening resumes submitted to KBR, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) lacks the ability to make final hiring decisions, Exhibit (2) pertains.

5. Ultimately, this investigation determined the KBR hiring protocol is a multi-step process, wherein many individuals other than (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) have a large role. As such, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) lacks the authority to influence the KBR hiring process aboard CLDJ as alleged. Consequently, the allegations of criminal activity were unable to be substantiated.

6. On 06JAN15, KBR personnel aboard CLDJ were apprised of the closure of this investigation.

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CONTROL:05JAN15-MEDJ-0002-4HNA/C

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ACTION

0023: CLOSED ONLY Report

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NCISHQ:0023/023A

ACTION:0023

INFO :MEFO

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# U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION (CLOSED ONLY)

10AUG15

FORGERY - GOVERNMENT (II)

CONTROL: 06AUG15-MEDJ-0177-4KNA/C

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

COMMAND/CAMP LEMONNIER, DJIBOUTI/3955A

MADE AT/MEDJ/DJIBOUTI - NCISRU (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), SPECIAL AGENT

## EXHIBIT(S)

- (1) IA: Results of Interview of (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) 06Aug15
- (2) IA: Results of Photographic Documentation of Possible Photo Copy Store/09Aug15
- (3) IA: Results of SEEK documentation provided by JTFAC/10Aug15

## NARRATIVE

1. This report was initiated to document the fraudulent use of base access badges onboard Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti. The subject in question is a Djiboutian National; no United States Code (USC) applies.

2. On 05Aug15, NCISRA Djibouti was notified by Security Forces, Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti (CLDJ), that they had detained (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) CIV, Djiboutian National in regards to a Be On The Lookout (BOLO) they had posted at the main Entrance Control Point (ECP) pertaining to (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) utilizing a fraudulent Base Access Card (BAC) to access CLDJ. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) had previously turned a fraudulent BAC to COLAS, who is a subcontractor for BL Harbert, at the termination of his job contract. BL Harbert is a construction company utilized by the United States Government (USG) for the construction of facilities on board CLDJ. NCIS interviewed (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) at bldg. 123, Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti. Exhibit (1) pertains.

3. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated to NCIS he made the copy of his BAC at a store where copies are made for Djiboutian identification cards. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated this store was located downtown Djibouti City near the Hamoudi Mosque (NFI). (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated he paid 200 Djiboutian Francs (equivalent of 1.16 USD) for the copy of his BAC. NCIS agents located the possible store and identified it as Photo Royal, Djibouti City, Djibouti. Exhibit (2) pertains.

4. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated he made a copy of his BAC because he was afraid that his former employer COLAS was not going to produce his final paycheck. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated subsequent to turning in his fraudulent BAC to his previous employer he continued to enter CLDJ looking for employment with his official BAC for approximately 2 months. Circa August 2015, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) found employment with Safar (NFI). (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated he was not aware of any other individual utilizing fraudulent BAC's. NCIS asked (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) if he was a threat to CLDJ. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated he would not hurt the people onboard CLDJ and he just wanted to be employed in order to provide for his family (NFI)

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that resides in Balbala, Djibouti.

5. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was transported to the Base Access Control Office (BACO), Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, in order to be entered in to the Secure Electronic Enrollment Kit (SEEK) system. SGT (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), USA, BACO, entered (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) into the SEEK system and added a derogatory entry into the notes section. The derogatory entry read (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was in the possession of a fraudulent BAC.

6. Subsequent to (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) being entered into the SEEK system, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was transported to the Djiboutian National Police (DNP) Office, Camp Lemmonier, located outside the Viper gate. Lt (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and Sgt (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) DNP, were briefed of the situation and at that time took custody of (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

7. On 07Aug15, Lt (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) DNP, 3rd District, Djibouti made contact with NCIS in order to ascertain if CLDJ was going to pursue charges on (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated they would detain (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) for 48 hours and if no one from base came to press charges (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) would be released.

8. On 08Aug15, NCIS received notification from CAPT (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) CO, USN, CLDJ, that no charges would be pursued in reference to (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

9. On 10Aug15, the Joint Theater Forensic Analysis Center provided NCIS with a readable SEEK report. Exhibit (3) pertains.

10. This case is closed.

PARTICIPANTS

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) ECIAL AGENT, DJIBOUTI - NCISRU  
LINGUIST, DJIBOUTI - NCISRU

DISTRIBUTION

NCISHQ:0023

INFO :002A/MEFO/MEDJ

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# U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION (CLOSED ONLY)

16MAR17

COUNTERFEITING (II)

CONTROL: 06MAR17-MEDJ-0060-6GNA/C

I/CAMP LEMONNIER, DJIBOUTI/RECEIPT OF SUSPECTED COUNTERFEIT CURRENCY  
FROM SUBWAY SANDWICH SHOP

COMMAND/CAMP LEMONNIER/00000

MADE AT/MEDJ/DJIBOUTI - NCISRU (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SPECIAL AGENT

## EXHIBIT(S)

- (1) IA: RECEIPT OF BASE POLICE DOCUMENTATION AND EVIDENCE/07MAR17
- (2) IA: REVIEW OF VIDEO SECURITY FOOTAGE/16MAR17
- (3) IA: RESULTS OF CONTACT WITH YNC (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USN/15MAR17

## NARRATIVE

1. This report documents the use of a suspected counterfeit \$100.00 note at the Main Navy Exchange (NEX) aboard Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti (CLDJ). The United States Secret Service (USSS) has jurisdiction over violations of the applicable statute, Title 18 USC 473 (Dealing in Counterfeit Obligations or Securities).

2. On 06Mar17, MA1 (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USMC, Command Investigator, CLDJ, provided Base Police Incident Report #173955A00031, which detailed Base Police's response to the NEX following notification that three, possibly-Italian customers paid for three Subway sandwiches with a suspected counterfeit \$100 bill on 27Feb17. Base Police seized the suspected counterfeit \$100 bill, and turned the item over to NCISRA Djibouti for entry into the Evidence Custody System under Log #006-17. Exhibit (1) pertains.

3. Between 06Mar17 and 16Mar17, security video footage captured at and around the Subway sandwich shop on 27Feb17 was reviewed. The review disclosed four unidentified male subjects entered the Subway, ordered three sandwiches, and paid for the sandwiches with the suspected counterfeit \$100 bill. Exhibit (2) pertains.

4. On 15Mar17, YNC (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USN, Coalition Coordinator Chief Liaison, advised she did not recognize the four unidentified male subjects, but would be on the lookout for subjects matching their description when dealing with Italian Coalition members in the future. Exhibit (3) pertains.

5. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), Assistant to the Special Agent in Charge, USSS, Paris, France, confirmed the bill was counterfeit, and requested NCISRA Djibouti forward the evidence to the U.S. Embassy located at 2 Avenue Gabriel, 75008 Paris, France.

6. Due to the absence of any viable leads, this investigation is closed. Should additional information develop in the future, this investigation may

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CONTROL:06MAR17-MEDJ-0060-6GNA/C

16MAR17

be reopened.

DISCLOSURE ACCOUNTING

7. A copy of this report, as well as the counterfeit \$100 bill, will be forwarded to the USSS for law enforcement purposes.

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INFO :USSS, Paris Field Office (ASAC (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (M) /MEBJ/  
MEDJ

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# U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION (CLOSED ONLY)

08FEB17

GENERAL PROCUREMENT (II)

CONTROL: 07FEB17-MEDJ-0033-4GNA/C

I/ALLEGATIONS OF FRAUDULENT CONTRACT BIDDING BY MGT DJIBOUTI SARL

COMMAND/CAMP LEMONNIER/3379A

MADE AT/MEDJ/DJIBOUTI - NCISRU (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SPECIAL AGENT

## EXHIBIT(S)

(1) IA: RESULTS OF CONTACT WITH	(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)	FEB17
(2) IA: RESULTS OF CONTACT WITH	(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)	17
(3) IA: RESULTS OF CONTACT WITH	(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)	B17
(4) IA: RESULTS OF CONTACT WITH	(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)	EB17
(5) IA: RESULTS OF CONTACT WITH	(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)	7FEB17

## NARRATIVE

1. This investigation pertains to suspected violations of Title 18 US Code (USC) 1031 (Major Fraud against the United States), and Title 18 USC 287 (False, Fictitious or Fraudulent Claims).

2. On 25Jan17, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), Senior Associate Counsel, Office of General Counsel, Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, reported possible fraudulent activity by the contracting company, MGT Djibouti SARL. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised MGT was awarded a contract (N33191-16-D-1055) to supply vehicle transportation services aboard Camp Lemonnier. The solicitation for this contract included the requirement the vendor be a "Djibouti First" eligible company. After the contract was awarded, MGT shipped vehicles to the Port of Djibouti, where they were detained until MGT paid the Djiboutian government import taxes. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Project Manager, MGT, reportedly obtained US-contractor tax-exoneration forms for the vehicles from Camp Lemonnier. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised MGT's efforts to avoid paying the Djiboutian government brought MGT's status as a "Djibouti First" company into question. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) requested assistance in determining whether (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) misrepresented his company in order to secure a "Djibouti First" government contract. Exhibit (1) pertains.

3. On 02Feb17, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Economic & Commercial Officer, U.S. Embassy Djibouti, advised he was responsible for evaluating MGT's request to be added to the list of "Djibouti First" eligible companies. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) reported he met (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) at MGT's company office, located at Lot 535 Haramous, adjacent to the U.S. Embassy in Djibouti. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) interviewed (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) regarding the request, during which (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) claimed MGT pays Djiboutian taxes and frequently hires Djiboutian sub-contractors. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) reported both actions count towards "Djibouti First" eligibility, and (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) approved MGT's request to be added to the "Djibouti First" list. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) subsequently told him the Port of Djibouti would not release MGT's vehicles until import taxes were paid. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said he was under the impression MGT's status as a "Djibouti First" company negated any entitlement to

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US-contractor tax exoneration benefits. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) opined MGT was "not acting in good faith." (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) elaborated that MGT would be fulfilling the criteria of "Djibouti First" if the company subcontracted local vendors, like Transit Marill or Pyramid Car Rental, to supply the vehicles for the contract. Exhibit (2) pertains.

4. On 02Feb17, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Chief of Contracts, Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) Europe Africa Southwest Asia (EURAFSWA), reported MGT's electronic bid for the vehicle contract contained a notice that the submitted quote did not include taxes. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised this notice disqualified the bid from the selection process, but the contract was awarded to MGT anyway. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) reported this issue would be handled on an internal level, and declined to provide any additional information regarding the MGT's electronic bid. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) added the contract would normally have been terminated for default following MGT's failure to supply the required vehicles to Camp Lemonnier, but (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Contracting Officer, Public Works Department, and CPO (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), Chief of Contracts, authorized MGT to provide older vehicles that did not satisfy the contract's specifications. Exhibit (3) pertains.

5. On 04Feb17, LT (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), USN, Installation Transportation Officer (ITO), Fleet Logistic Center (N4), Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti (FLC-DJI), reported an unidentified representative from Transit Marill, a "Djibouti First" shipping company, brought the MGT vehicle bill of lading to N4, and subsequently received tax exoneration paperwork, dated 30Nov16, and signed by PO2 (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised the N4 personnel are only responsible for establishing whether the goods itemized on the bill of lading will be for "100% government use" before tax exoneration paperwork is endorsed. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said it is not N4 policy to differentiate between US and Non-US companies during this process, and advised he was under the impression that such a distinction was not relevant as long as the goods being received were for use solely on Camp Lemonnier. Exhibit (4) pertains.

6. On 06Feb17, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), Audit-Tax Office, Directorate of General Taxes, Djibouti, advised MGT is currently a registered entity with the Djiboutian government, and is legally licensed to lease vehicles, utilize rental cars and transport trucks, and operate heavy equipment within Djibouti. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised MGT paid taxes in 2015, 2016, and 2017. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) reported a letter/certificate was sent to MGT documenting these payments. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised all other tax-related information was confidential and could not be provided without authorization from MGT.

7. On 07Feb17, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was apprised of the status of this investigation. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) agreed that MGT fulfilled a number of "Djibouti First" criteria, to include being a registered entity with the Djiboutian government, having a record of paying Djiboutian taxes, and attempting to utilize another "Djibouti First" company to transport MGT's vehicles from the Port to Camp Lemonnier. Consequently, MGT was eligible for "Djibouti First" status when MGT submitted its bid for the vehicle contract.

8. No criminal misconduct has been substantiated during the course of this investigation. Should additional information be developed supporting felony criminal violation(s), an investigation will be reinitiated. This

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investigation is closed.

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Pages 17 through 18 redacted for the following reasons:

-----Pages (17) - (18): Case Control Number: 07NOV16-MEDJ-0238-4TNA/C - Referred to the U. S. Army Criminal Investigation  
(USACIC) for review/return

# U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION (CLOSED ONLY)

11SEP15

SPECIAL INQUIRY (II)

CONTROL: 10SEP15-MEDJ-0206-4XNA/C

I/CAMP LEMONNIER, DJIBOUTI/ALLEGATION OF PAY ISSUES WITH DJIBOUTIAN NATIONALS ABOARD CAMP LEMONNIER

COMMAND/CAMP LEMONNIER, DJIBOUTI/3379A

MADE AT/MEDJ/DJIBOUTI - NCISRU (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SPECIAL AGENT

## EXHIBIT(S)

- (1) IA: RESULTS OF RECEIPT OF ALLEGATIONS INVOLVING LOCAL NATIONAL PAY/10SEP15
- (2) IA: RESULTS OF COORDINATION WITH NAVFAC, CLDJ/10SEP15
- (3) IA: RESULTS OF MEETING WITH B.L. HARBERT INTERNATIONAL, LLC/10SEP15
- (4) IA: RESULTS OF DJIBOUTIAN CLDJ WORKERS INTERVIEWS/10SEP15
- (5) IA: RESULTS OF MEETING WITH EMPLOYMENT AGENCY OF DJIBOUTI (EAD)/10SEP15
- (6) IA: RESULTS OF MEETING WITH PRIME PROJECTS INTERNATIONAL/10SEP15

## NARRATIVE

1. This reactive investigation was initiated after NCISRA Djibouti received several allegations regarding the lack of payment to Djiboutian local nationals working for various contractors aboard Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti (CLDJ). This was a joint investigation with the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) Djibouti, DCIS Information Report #2015002480-80DJ-J0/X.

2. In Aug15, NCISRA Djibouti received several allegations that Djiboutian local nationals working for various contractors aboard CLDJ were not getting paid by the contractors. The first allegation was from (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), Contracting Officer (KO), Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC), Europe, Africa, Southwest Asia (EURAFSWA), Public Works Division-Acquisition, CLDJ (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised there were rumors that Djiboutian nationals working for Kellogg Brown and Root Services, Incorporated (KBR), the Base Operations Services Contractor (BOSC), were not being paid properly by KBR. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) did not have any specifics nor did she have any specific complainants. Later in Aug15, NCISRA Djibouti was advised of two physical assaults involving Djiboutian local nationals working for B.L. Harbert International, LLC (Harbert) a construction company working aboard CLDJ. Allegedly the two assaults were due to Djiboutian local nationals not being paid for time worked. Exhibit (1) provides further detail.

3. Reporting Agent (RA) and Participating Agent (PA) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) DCIS Djibouti, met with (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) to gain an understanding of how the KBR and Harbert contracts were set up. Both Harbert and KBR operate under firm fixed price (FFP) contracts. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised that as FFP contracts, it is not the

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# U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

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responsibility of the U.S. Government to review and/or provide oversight regarding the labor practices associated with KBR or Harbert. The payment for these contracts is solely based on the successful completion of services (b)(6), (b)(7)(S) stated she was aware that KBR and Harbert utilized local "labor brokers" to hire and pay Djiboutian local nationals since the companies may not understand Djiboutian laws when it comes to pay and vacation. These "labor brokers" facilitate the hiring and pay of the local nationals, essentially the Djiboutian local nationals would be employed by their respective "labor broker". Exhibit (2) pertains.

4. RA and PA (b)(6), (b)(7)(M) met with (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Program Manager, Harbert, to gain an understanding as to how Djiboutian local nationals are paid by Harbert. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) explained that Harbert does not hire or pay any Djiboutian local nationals directly, advising that Harbert awarded a subcontract to G4S to manage labor related matters. G4S is an international company and maintains an office in Djibouti City, Djibouti. G4S is responsible for hiring Djiboutian local nationals, managing the payroll of the Djiboutian local nationals, and a variety of similar functions. Additionally, G4S is responsible for abiding by all Djiboutian laws and regulations regarding labor practices. Brown advised that G4S serves as a "labor provider" or "labor broker" for Harbert. All of the Djiboutian local national laborers supplied to Harbert are employed by G4S, not Harbert. Harbert does maintain the time and attendance records for the Djiboutian local national laborers, and subsequently submits the respective time records to G4S for payroll processing. If a Djiboutian laborer expresses an issue with his or her pay, Harbert will verify the hours worked with G4S. If a mistake occurred the laborer's pay, it would be corrected by G4S. Exhibit (3) provides further details.

5. RA, PA (b)(6), (b)(7)(A) and NCISRA Djibouti Linguist (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) interviewed several Djiboutian local nationals working on CLDJ as contract employees with KBR to obtain information regarding potential issues involving pay. The interviews revealed that Djiboutian local nationals working for KBR are actually employed and paid by a "labor broker", the Employment Agency of Djibouti (EAD). The Agents gathered information related to how Djiboutian local nationals working under the KBR contract are paid varying on the pay levels assigned by KBR. The individuals spoken to said their pay is direct deposited into their bank accounts. A consistent complaint was their pay being late sometimes each month. Other complaints were not getting paid for a holiday or vacation, but the Djiboutians said they could file grievances with EAD and seek to rectify their pay. Exhibit (4) pertains.

6. RA and PA (b)(6), (b)(7)(M) met with (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) KBR liaison between KBR and EAD, and (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) EAD, CLDJ on site representative, to obtain information regarding EAD's relationship with KBR. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised KBR awarded a subcontract to EAD for recruitment services. EAD was hired by KBR to be a "labor broker". KBR provides a list of job positions they need filled aboard CLDJ, which includes the pay level and skill rating, to EAD. KBR determines the pay levels, with level one being the lowest paid and level five being the highest paid and a majority of all KBR new hires start off as a level one. EAD conducts initial screening interviews of the individuals while KBR will conduct secondary interviews of those who make it through EAD's screening process. Once KBR endorses the hiring of a Djiboutian local national, EAD has the individual sign a contract with EAD

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11SEP15

in which he/she acknowledges the level of employment that he/she is being hired for. Per Djiboutian government regulations, companies working in Djibouti are required to pay Djiboutian local nationals on a monthly basis. Per EAD's subcontract with KBR, EAD receives monthly payments from KBR. These funds include payment to EAD and payments for EAD to remit to the Djiboutian local nationals. ISMAEL and DEL WAISS advised that on occasion, the monthly payments from KBR are late; however, EAD does its best to remit, on time, monthly payments to the Djiboutian local nationals who conduct work for KBR on CLDJ. The Djiboutian local nationals receive their pay on the ninth of every month, which is also explained to them in the contract they sign with EAD. Exhibit (5) provides further details.

7. RA and PA ~~(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~ also met with ~~(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~ Project Manager, Prime Projects International (Construction) Ltd. (PPI), to gather information on how they pay Djiboutian local nationals working aboard CLDJ. ~~(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~ stated that PPI uses two "labor brokers" to hire and pay their Djiboutian local nationals; Brothers and Sisters Security Services (BSSS) and Enterprise Douda Security and Services (EDSS). PPI utilizes two pay scales based on skilled labor or general labor. PPI has BSSS and EDSS invoice them twice per month, so they pay the brokers twice per month. They do this in hopes of ensuring BSSS and EDSS always have funds available. ~~(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~ indicated that according to the subcontract they have with BSSS and EDSS the Djiboutian local nationals working on their projects are paid by the hour. ~~(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~ said the Djiboutian local nationals do not work for PPI, but are employed by either BSSS or EDSS. ~~(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~ explained when complaints of pay have arisen from the Djiboutian local nationals they have been directed to speak with either BSSS or EDSS depending on who they are employed with. Exhibit (6) pertains.

8. Based on information obtained during the inquiry, no further action will be taken by DCIS or NCISRA Djibouti. Investigation closed.

## PARTICIPANTS

~~(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)~~ SA, DCIS Djibouti

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